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IS SILENCE FOR SALE? THE FIRST
AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY’S
SETTLEMENT WITH LARRY NASSAR
SURVIVORS
Emily O. Monnett*
Michigan State University (“MSU”) has been embroiled
in one of the largest sports or academic scandals in history.1 In
2016, reporters from the IndyStar

began the process of

uncovering years of sexual abuse at the hands of MSU faculty
member Dr. Larry Nassar.2 Over the course of the investigation,
it was revealed that Nassar had sexually assaulted hundreds of
girls and young women over the course of two decades.3 The
majority of the assaults occurred at MSU.4
Nassar will be in jail for the rest of his life, serving
sentences for criminal sexual conduct and child pornography.5
Additionally, MSU has been under investigation for its role in
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1
See, e.g., Caroline Kitchener & Alia Wong, The Moral Catastrophe at
Michigan State, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/09/the-moralcatastrophe-at-michigan-state/569776/.
2
Tim Evans, Mark Alesia & Marisa Kwiatkowski, Former USA Gymnastics
Doctor Accused of Abuse, INDYSTAR (Sept. 12, 2016),
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2016/09/12/former-usagymnastics-doctor-accused-abuse/89995734/.
3
Kitchener, supra note 1.
4
Id.
5
Lauren Theisen, Larry Nassar Sentenced to Additional 40 to 125 Years in Prison,
DEADSPIN (Feb. 5, 2018, 9:49 AM), https://deadspin.com/larry-nassarsentenced-to-additional-40-to-125-years-in-1822724375.
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Nassar’s actions.6 Survivors7 of Nassar’s abuse claim that the
University was aware of the abuse and went to great lengths to
cover it up.8 For example, one filed a lawsuit alleging that in 1992
Nassar filmed himself raping a student-athlete, and a member of
MSU’s board of trustees took steps to conceal the video.9 In May
2018, MSU settled with 332 survivors of Nassar’s abuse for $500
million, though the university’s troubles remain.10
The settlement is historic, but the amount is unsurprising
given the number of victims and the number of complaints that
the University ignored over the course of almost two decades.11
But the settlement came with a surprising provision: Survivors of
the abuse agreed to stop advocating for two specific reform bills
that the Michigan state legislature were debating and voting
upon at the time of the settlement.12 The bills were originally

6

Kitchener, supra note 1.
In this essay, I will use the term “survivor” and “victim” interchangeably.
Both terms have value and can serve different purposes. The use of both
terms also allows for exclusivity and recognizes a variety of responses to
trauma. For more explanation on the use of the terms, see RTI
International, Victim or Survivor: Terminology from Investigation Through
Prosecution, SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT INITIATIVE 1,
https://sakitta.org/toolkit/docs/Victim-or-Survivor-Terminology-fromInvestigation-Through-Prosecution.pdf.
8
Kitchener, supra note 1.
9
Id.
10
Dvora Meyers, Michigan State's Nassar Settlement Could Set a Troubling First
Amendment Precedent, DEADSPIN (May 18, 2018, 2:02 PM),
https://deadspin.com/michigan-states-nassar-settlement-could-set-atroubling-1826139831; Kitchener, supra note 1.
11
Id.
12
Id.
7
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introduced in February 2018 through the combined efforts of
survivors of Nassar’s abuse and Michigan state legislators.13 The
two bills at issue would have ended governmental immunity14 for
cases of childhood sexual abuse.15 The governmental immunity
provisions of the bills were only one piece of the bills’ efforts to
combat childhood sexual abuse; the bills also included
provisions to expand the statute of limitations, allow victims of
childhood sexual abuse to file lawsuits anonymously, and
expand mandatory reporting laws.16
At the time the settlement was announced, state
legislators declared they would continue to work on and
advocate for the reform bills, even though the survivors of
Nassar’s abuse were required to pull their support.17 Several
legislators

13

committed

their

support

specifically

to

the

Jonathan Oosting, Nassar Victims Push Changes to Michigan Law, THE
DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 26, 2018, 7:17 PM),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2018/02/26/nassarvictims-sexual-assault-legislation/110876874/.
14
Governmental immunity shields a state government from liability. Odom
v. Wayne Cty., 760 N.W.2d 217, 227 (Mich. 2008). Under the doctrine, the
state or state entity is only liable when the state has expressly permitted a
suit against it. Id.
15
Meyers, supra note 10.
16
Id.
17
Beth LeBlanc & Jonathan Oosting, Nassar Bills Expected to Change
Regardless of MSU Deal, THE DETROIT NEWS (May 17, 2018, 7:44 PM),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/05/17/n
assar-legislation-changes-msu-agreement/35038653/ (“Sen. Margaret
O’Brien, who sponsored some of the post-Nassar legislation, said she
remains committed to the package as it passed out of the Senate in March,
including the proposal related to governmental immunity.”).
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governmental immunity provisions.18 But the Michigan state
legislature changed its tune in July 2018, a week after the
settlement agreement was filed in the U.S. District Court in
Grand Rapids.19 State legislators dropped the governmental
immunity bills and modified another in accordance with the
provisions in the settlement.20 Bob Young, an attorney who
helped negotiate the settlement on behalf of MSU, said the
settlement’s reference to the legislation indicates an agreed-upon
outcome that would result from victims’ pulling their support for
the legislation.21 The settlement was entirely conditioned on the
failure of the bills.22 The settlement agreement explicitly stated
that the settlement itself was only valid once the bills failed.23
Furthermore, Young confirmed that the failure of the bills was
18

Id. (“Sen. Curtis Hertel Jr., D-East Lansing, said he will immediately
introduce new legislation if the House drops the governmental immunity bill
or other provisions he deems critical.”).
19
See Beth LeBlanc, Filing Sheds New Light on Nassar Settlement, THE
DETROIT NEWS (July 18, 2018, 6:01 PM),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/07/18/fi
ling-msu-nassar-victims-settlement/797632002/.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
The necessary condition that “(1) Michigan Senate Bill 872 (2018) either
shall (A) fail to be enacted into law because it is withdrawn, defeated by
vote, or otherwise fails to pass, or (B) be amended to reduce the timeframe
to bring otherwise time-barred Nassar-Related Claims to 90 days following
enactment of Senate Bill 872 (2018); and (2) Michigan Senate Bills 875
(2018) and 877 (2018) shall fail to be enacted into law because they are
withdrawn, defeated by vote, or otherwise fail to pass” is marked as satisfied
in the settlement agreement. See Lauren Theisen, Here's Michigan State's
Settlement Agreement With Larry Nassar's Victims, DEADSPIN (July 18, 2018,
9:42 PM), https://deadspin.com/heres-michigan-states-settlementagreement-with-larry-n-1827705229.
23
Thiesen, supra note 25.
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the only way that MSU could see any demonstrable result from
the survivors’ pulling their support of the reform bills.24
Michigan State had a lot riding on these bills.25 In
addition to the complaints they already settled, the University
faces a federal lawsuit from 257 of the survivors.26 In a motion to
dismiss that lawsuit, the University responded, “As much as
MSU sympathizes with Plaintiffs, it would be contrary to the
State's established public policy, as embodied in the laws and the
decisions of its courts, to impose legal liability on the MSU
Defendants,” citing governmental immunity from these kinds of
suits.27 In August 2019, MSU sought to dismiss another wave of
lawsuits on the grounds of governmental immunity.28
Here, the damage is done and the governmental
immunity bills are dead, but several First Amendment
commentators have decried the provision of the settlement that

24

Amy Rock, Full Details of MSU Settlement with Nassar Victims Released,
CAMPUS SAFETY (July 20, 2018),
https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/clery/details-msu-settlementnassar-victims (“The only way we could assure ourselves that their support
had been withdrawn was a demonstrable result. That’s why it’s worded that
way.”).
25
See Nicholas Roumel, Is Michigan State's Nassar Settlement Fake News for
Some Survivors?, NACHTLAW (May 23, 2018),
https://www.nachtlaw.com/blog/2018/05/is-michigan-states-nassarsettlement-fake-news-for-some-survivors/.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Michigan State: We’re Immune from Liability in Nassar Claims, WTOP (Aug.
27, 2019, 2:33 PM), https://wtop.com/national/2019/08/michigan-statewere-immune-to-liability-in-nassar-claims.

2019]

IS SILENCE FOR SALE?

147

limited survivors’ ability to advocate for reform.29 Commentators
point out that state officials are working to silence the political
speech of the survivors, and that these provisions are not
enforceable.30 They express concern about the precedent these
kinds of settlements set for future litigation.31
Unfortunately, it is likely that a school, government
official, or other state actor will be involved in a similar scandal.32
The MSU settlement is a roadmap for defeating unfriendly
legislation. Going forward, whether provisions limiting a party’s
First Amendment rights can be successfully challenged will
continue to be an important legal issue. And not just a sexual
violence issue. Regardless of the issue, litigation and legislation
are both powerful reform tools. If settlements can be used to kill
legislation, they could hobble an important tool for social and
political change.

29

Meyers, supra note 10; LeBlanc & Oosting, supra note 18.
Meyers, supra note 10; LeBlanc & Oosting, supra note 18.
31
Meyers, supra note 10.
32
In recent years, there have been sexual assault scandals at Pennsylvania
State University, MSU, and the University of Southern California. Greg
Toppo, Why Do Colleges Keep Failing to Prevent Abuse?, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(June 5, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/06/05/whydo-campus-abuse-cases-keep-falling-through-cracks. The recent scandals
within the Catholic Church provide a good example of how widespread
sexual abuse scandals are. See, e.g., Emma Green, Why Does the Catholic
Church Keep Failing on Sexual Abuse?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/02/sean-omalleypope-francis-catholic-church-sex-abuse/582658 (providing some background
on recent sexual abuse scandals within the Catholic Church).
30
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This Note evaluates whether courts can and should
enforce provisions of settlement agreements between private
parties and state actors that limit one party’s First Amendment
rights. Section I of this Note looks at constitutional issues in
determining the enforceability of this settlement. Section II of
this Note evaluates the enforceability of this settlement under the
Rumery/Grossmont framework. Section III looks at the traditional
contract theory and the public policy exception as a means of
challenging the settlement provision. Section IV concludes by
summarizing how and why similar settlements can—and must––
be challenged.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Several outspoken critics of the MSU settlement have
expressed concern about its implications for the First
Amendment.33 But it is important to first analyze whether the
First Amendment is implicated at all. The First Amendment of
the United States Constitution states, “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”34 Of all the
33
34

Meyers, supra note 10; LeBlanc & Oosting, supra note 18.
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
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rights protected by the First Amendment, the MSU settlement
would most likely implicate the freedom of speech.
A. Freedom of Speech
The First Amendment has historically limited the
legislative authority of the federal government.35 However, the
interaction between the First and Fourteenth Amendments36 of
the Constitution extends the reach of First Amendment
protections.37 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, states and
state actors, including education officials at public institutions,
must act within the confines of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights.38 The First Amendment does not apply to private actors,
and thus there can be no First Amendment violation without
action by the state or federal government.39 In this way, the
protections of the Constitution and the First Amendment extend

35

See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . .”) (emphasis added).
36
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
37
See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (“The
Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures . . . .”).
38
See id. (“[Boards of Education] have, of course, important, delicate, and
highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within
the limits of the Bill of Rights.”).
39
See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S.
288, 295 (2001).
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beyond laws passed by Congress and can apply to certain actions
taken by state actors.40 The courts have not established one
singular test for determining what is or is not state action.41
Instead, it is a fact-specific inquiry.42 That said, state universities
and public schools have traditionally been treated as government
entities subject to constitutional limitations.43 As a publicly
funded university,44 Michigan State University is bound by the
Constitution, including the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court of the United States has been clear
that “the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.”45 The government cannot
proscribe speech merely because it disapproves of the ideas
expressed.46 Historically, this means that restrictions on First
Amendment rights are only constitutional when the restrictions
are

40

“content

neutral.”47

“Content-based

regulations

are

See id. at 293.
Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Because of the factintensive nature of the inquiry, courts have developed a variety of
approaches to the State actor issue.”).
42
Id.
43
See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
44
See MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (“The legislature shall appropriate moneys
to maintain . . . Michigan State University . . .”).
45
Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
46
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992).
47
See id. at 382.
41
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presumptively invalid.”48 More specifically, “[l]aws designed or
intended to suppress or restrict the expression of specific speakers
contradict

basic

First

Amendment

principles.”49

When

challenged, content-based restrictions can only survive if they
pass strict scrutiny, meaning the restriction is constitutional only
if it is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government
interest.50 Furthermore, speech on matters of public concern are
historically given more rigorous First Amendment protection.51
Speech on matters of public concern is a fairly broad concept and
includes speech that can “be fairly considered as relating to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.”52
Here, a restriction on speech is targeted specifically at
survivors of Nassar’s abuse and is focused on their advocacy on
two specific reform bills. It should be noted that the settlement
provision is technically an indirect restriction on the waiver of
the survivors’ First Amendment rights, as it says the bills must

48

R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382. Content-based restrictions are permitted for
certain categories of “speech,” including: obscenity, defamation, and
“fighting words.” Id. at 382-83.
49
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000).
50
Id. at 813. (“If a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.”).
51
See generally Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“[R]estricting
speech on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional
concerns as limiting speech on matters of public interest . . .”); Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“[S]peech on public issues occupies the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to
special protection.”) (internal quotations omitted).
52
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
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fail for the settlement to be valid rather than the survivors cannot
advocate for the bills. However, this should not change the
analysis because it was understood and intended as a waiver of
the survivors’ political speech.53 Counsel for MSU made it clear
that the provision of the settlement was related to the survivors’
advocacy by saying, “The only way we could assure ourselves
that their support had been withdrawn was a demonstrable
result. That’s why [the settlement is] worded that way.”54 The
condition in the settlement was meant as a way to enforce and
verify the withdrawal of support for the bills. It was meant to
restrict the survivors’ First Amendment rights. Based on the text
and the statements made by MSU’s counsel, it is hard to argue
the provision was about anything other than forcing the survivors
to withdraw their political support and silence their political
advocacy.
As a state actor, MSU cannot place a content-based
restriction on speech that is not narrowly tailored to a compelling
government interest.55 It is unclear what MSU would cite as a
compelling governmental interest in restricting the speech of
Nassar’s victims. Realistically, MSU’s strongest interest is in

53

See id.
Rock, supra note 26.
55
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992).
54

2019]

IS SILENCE FOR SALE?

153

maintaining governmental immunity to avoid liability in future
lawsuits. As discussed previously, the two reform bills would
work to limit the defense of governmental immunity in cases of
child sexual abuse.56 MSU has a strong interest in avoiding
another $500 million settlement, but it is unclear how this
argument would stand up in court. It may be difficult to argue
that there is a compelling government interest in preventing the
public from weighing in on the reform bills, especially given that
there were elected representatives pushing for the reform bills.57
At the very least, there is a strong argument that creating
a condition in their settlement is not narrowly tailored to this
interest. Instead, MSU could have engaged in their own political
advocacy around the bills or taken other steps to fight the bills at
issue. Conversely, the settlement only restricts the survivor’s
ability to advocate for two specific reform bills rather than
foreclosing all future political advocacy. State legislators could
introduce a new bill with the exact same provisions, and victims
of Nassar’s abuse are free to support it. In that sense, the
restriction may be narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s
interest.

56
57

Meyers, supra note 10.
LeBlanc & Oosting, supra note 18.
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The survivors’ ability to speak about their experiences in
promoting reform measures is a matter of public concern and
should be given robust First Amendment protections. The
settlement concerns one of the largest sports and academic
scandals in American history. The public has a strong interest in
learning and hearing about it from all angles, not only because
Michigan is still considering reform measures in the wake of the
scandal but also because it was a historic and culturally
significant event.
The provision of the settlement restricting the survivor’s
political speech violates their First Amendment rights and thus
can additionally be challenged under the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.
1. Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
Under
settlement

the

unconstitutional

agreement

is

conditions

likely

doctrine,

unenforceable.

the
The

unconstitutional conditions doctrine stands for the idea that the
government cannot grant a benefit on the condition that the
beneficiary surrender a constitutional right.58 For example, the
government cannot require an organization to support or

58

E.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604
(2013); Rumsfield v. Forum for Acad. and Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
60 (2006). See also 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 411 (2019).
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promote a particular position in order to receive federal funds,
thus infringing on the organization’s right to free speech.59
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies even when
the government could have withheld the benefit altogether.60
When the doctrine applies, courts must use strict scrutiny in
assessing the condition at issue.61 In order for the condition to be
constitutionally valid, the government interest must outweigh
the particular right at issue.62 Furthermore, the government
cannot require an individual to give up a right in exchange for a
discretionary benefit when the benefit given has little relation to
the issue at hand.63 A state actor cannot constitutionally
condition the receipt of a benefit on an agreement that the
recipient will surrender a constitutional right.64
Accordingly, the government cannot deny a benefit from
an individual in a way that infringes on that person’s First

See, e.g., U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. v.
Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013).
60
See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding that the
government cannot deny a discretionary benefit in a way that inhibits a
person’s constitutionally protecting rights). See also 16 AM. JUR. 2D
Constitutional Law § 411 (2019).
61
See AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 411 (2019).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
R.S.W.W., Inc. v. City of Keego Harbor, 397 F.3d 427, 434 (6th Cir.
2005); 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 411 (2019).
59
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Amendment rights.65 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine
protects “the Constitution's enumerated rights by preventing the
government from coercing people into giving them up”66 and
“ensure[s] that the government may not indirectly accomplish a
restriction on constitutional rights which it is powerless to decree
directly.”67 A condition is unconstitutional when the government
could not directly impose it.68 In essence, the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine protects our constitutional rights by
preventing the government from having a work-around for
things it is already powerless to do. Because the government
cannot pass a law saying its citizens cannot criticize the
government, it also cannot make not criticizing the government
a condition of receiving government benefits,69 obtaining a
permit,70 receiving funding,71 etc.
Through the settlement provision, MSU is restricting the
survivor’s First Amendment rights, something that it is otherwise
powerless to do. There is little debate that Michigan could have

65

See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604
(2013); Rumsfield v. Forum for Acad. and Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
60 (2006).
66
Koontz, 570 U.S. at 604.
67
16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 411 (2019).
68
See Rumsfield, 547 U.S. 47 at 60.
69
See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
70
Koontz, 570 U.S. at 606.
71
Rumsfield, 547 U.S. 47 at 59 (“[We] recognize a limit on Congress' ability
to place conditions on the receipt of funds.”).
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constitutionally directly prohibited the survivors of Nassar’s
abuse from advocating for reform measures. First, this would be
a content-based restriction on speech and subject to strict
scrutiny.72 Second, because it is about proposed legislation in the
wake of a massive government scandal, the speech at issue would
be a matter of public concern.73 Therefore, under the
constitutional conditions doctrine, MSU cannot indirectly
prohibit Nassar’s survivors from advocating for reform
measures.
As discussed previously, the settlement was wholly
conditioned on the failure of the two bills.74 Accordingly, the
settlement provision is indirectly conditioned on the waiver of
the survivors’ First Amendment rights, as it says the bills must
fail for the settlement to be enforced rather than that the survivors
cannot advocate for the bills. But this should not change the

72

See supra Section. II A.
See supra Section. II A.
74
The necessary condition that “(1) Michigan Senate Bill 872 (2018) either
shall (A) fail to be enacted into law because it is withdrawn, defeated by
vote, or otherwise fails to pass, or (B) be amended to reduce the timeframe
to bring otherwise time-barred Nassar-Related Claims to 90 days following
enactment of Senate Bill 872 (2018); and (2) Michigan Senate Bills 875
(2018) and 877 (2018) shall fail to be enacted into law because they are
withdrawn, defeated by vote, or otherwise fail to pass” is marked as satisfied
in the settlement agreement. See Lauren Theisen, Here's Michigan State's
Settlement Agreement With Larry Nassar's Victims, DEADSPIN (July 18, 2018),
https://deadspin.com/heres-michigan-states-settlement-agreement-withlarry-n-1827705229; see also Nick Roumel, Is Michigan State's Nassar
Settlement Fake News for Some Survivors?, NACHTLAW (May 23, 2018),
https://www.nachtlaw.com/blog/2018/05/is-michigan-states-nassarsettlement-fake-news-for-some-survivors.
73
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analysis because, as outlined above, it was understood and
intended as a waiver of the survivors’ political advocacy.75 As
the settlement was conditioned on the survivors’ waiver of First
Amendment rights, the settlement is unconstitutional under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
The Ninth Circuit decision in Davies v. Grossmont Union
High School Dist.76 also supports the conclusion that the
settlement is unenforceable. Grossmont dealt with a situation that
is most similar to the MSU settlement at issue. In understanding
Grossmont, it is also important to understand the Supreme
Court’s decision in Town of Newton v. Rumery.77
2. Rumery and Grossmont
In Rumery, the Supreme Court was asked to decide,
“whether a release of individual rights in a private settlement
agreement with a public official violated public policy.”78 The
Supreme Court held that “a promise is unenforceable if the
interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by
a public policy harmed by enforcement of the agreement.”79

75

See id.
Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1396 (9th
Cir. 1991).
77
480 U.S. 386 (1987).
78
Grossmont, 930 F.2d 1390, 1396; see Rumery, 480 U.S. at 392.
79
Rumery, 480 U.S. at 392 (plurality opinion).
76
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Bernard Rumery was arrested for witness tampering in
connection with a felony sexual assault.80 Rumery eventually
negotiated a release-dismissal agreement with the local
prosecutor, where the prosecutor agreed to drop all charges
against Rumery if he “would agree not to sue the town, its
officials, or [the victim] for any harm caused by [his] arrest.”81
Almost a year later, Rumery brought suit against the town of
Newton alleging that the town and its officers had violated his
constitutional rights.82 The suit was dismissed in Federal District
Court on the grounds that Rumery had agreed to release all
claims against the city.83
The Supreme Court held that such agreements were not
per se unenforceable84 and instead relied on a balancing test
weighing the public interest in enforcement versus nonenforcement.85 The Court concluded that release-dismissal
agreements are not any more coercive than plea-bargaining.86
They also relied on the fact that Rumery was a “sophisticated

80

Id. at 389-90.
Id. at 389-90.
82
Rumery, 480 U.S. at 391.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 392 (“Thus, although we agree that in some cases these agreements
may infringe important interests of the criminal defendant and of society as
a whole, we do not believe that the mere possibility of harm to these
interests calls for a per se rule.”).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 393.
81
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businessman,” who was competent to weigh the benefits and
drawbacks of gaining immunity from criminal prosecution in
exchange for abandoning a civil suit.87 The Court concluded that
there is a strong public interest in support of release-dismissal
agreements.88 Section 1983 suits, like the one Rumery filed, are
expensive and lengthy to defend. Release-dismissal agreements
“protect officials from the burdens of defending unjust claims . .
. [and] further this important public interest.”89
Four Justices disagreed with the Court’s analysis.90
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, argued that it was
improper to analogize release-dismissal agreements with pleabargaining.91 They concluded that an “agreement to forgo a civil
remedy for the violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights
in exchange for complete abandonment of a criminal charge”
was not at all like a plea bargain.92 The dissent relied on two main
points to suggest such agreements are unenforceable: first, the
agreements are inherently coercive, and second, the agreements
“exact[] a price unrelated to the character of the defendant’s own

87

Id. at 394.
Id. at 395 (plurality opinion).
89
Id. at 396.
90
Id. at 403 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91
Id. at 409.
92
Id.
88
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conduct.”93 The dissent did not go so far as to say that all releasedismissal agreements are unenforceable, but instead stated that
“the federal policies reflected in the enactment and enforcement
of § 1983 mandate a strong presumption against the
enforceability of such agreements and that the presumption is not
overcome in this case by the facts or by any of the policy concerns
discussed by the plurality.”94
In Davies v. Grossmont Union High School Dist.,95 the Ninth
Circuit applied Rumery and refused to enforce a contract
provision that prohibited an individual from running for office.
The appellant, Dr. Davies, and his wife had originally sued
Grossmont Union High School District under § 1983 in
connection with his wife’s employment with the district.96 Dr.
Davies and his wife eventually settled with the District, and the
settlement included a provision that he would not “ever seek,
apply for, or accept future employment, position, or office with
[Grossmont Union High School District.]”97 A year later, Dr.
Davies ran for the Governing Board of the District and was
elected.98 The District then sought to enforce the contract and

93

Id. at 411.
Id. at 417-18.
95
930 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991).
96
Id. at 1392.
97
Id.
98
Id.
94
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force Dr. Davies to resign.99 Dr. Davies challenged the
enforceability

of

the

order

upholding

the

settlement

agreement.100
The Ninth Circuit addressed a number of arguments from
Dr. Davies.101 They affirmed the idea that constitutional rights
may be waived “if it can be established by clear and convincing
evidence

that

the

waiver

is

voluntary,

knowing

and

intelligent.”102 They concluded that Dr. Davies had in fact
waived his constitutional right to seek office.103 However, the
Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the settlement agreement on
public policy grounds.104 The court agreed that enforcing the
contract “would violate [Dr. Davies’] constitutional right to run
for elective office and the constitutional right of the voters to elect
him.”105 In so deciding, the Ninth Circuit looked to Rumery106
and compared the two cases.
In differentiating the case from Rumery, the Ninth Circuit
focused primarily on the fact that the rights released by Rumery
were private rights,107 and “thus the Court believed that the
99

Id. at 1393.
Id. at 1394.
101
See id. at 1394-96.
102
Id. at 1394.
103
Id. at 1395.
104
Id. at 1396.
105
Id.
106
Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
107 Grossmont, 930 F.2d 1390, 1397 (9th Cir. 1991).
100
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surrender of these rights did not have a significant impact upon
the public at large.”108 The Ninth Circuit noted a clear distinction
between the surrender of a statutory remedy with the waiver of a
constitutional right.109 This distinction created two important
propositions.110 First, a stricter rule is more appropriate in cases
where a constitutional right is waived because constitutional
rights are “generally more fundamental than statutory rights.”111
Second, “foregoing a remedy of money damages for a past injury
that cannot be undone may not implicate the public interest to
the same extent as does the surrender of the right itself.”112 The
Davies court declined to follow that line of analysis, and instead
held that the case did not even meet the Rumery standard.113
The Ninth Circuit examined whether the public interest
is better served by enforcement of the agreement rather than nonenforcement.114 In terms of public policy in favor of nonenforcement, the settlement involved the waiver of the “the most
important political right in a democratic system of government:
the right of the people to elect representatives of their own

108

Id. at 1400.
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 1397.
114
Id.
109
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choosing to public office.”115 Unlike in Rumery, the waiver of the
right to run for office implicates the public interest and has an
effect on the public at large.116
In favor of enforcement is “a policy favoring enforcement
of private agreements and the encouragement of settling
litigation.”117 This interest is important but is present in every
settlement agreement.118 The court thus concluded that “where a
substantial public interest favoring nonenforcement is present,
the interest in settlement in insufficient.”119 The Ninth Circuit
then looked for an additional interest beyond the interest in
settlement.120 The court found that the school district’s other
interest in preventing Dr. Davies from being on the board was
malicious.121 Whether or not a person is fit to be on the school
board is an issue for the voters to decide during the election––not
members of the board during a settlement agreement.122 The
Ninth Circuit also took issue with commodification of political
rights and said it “corrupts the political process.”123

115

Id.
Id. at 1398.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. (“Otherwise, there would be no point to the Rumery balancing test:
since the interest in settlement is present in every case, every settlement
agreement would be enforced.”).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
See id.
123
Id.
116
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The Davies court went on to invalidate the agreement on
additional grounds.124
Before the government can require a citizen to
surrender a constitutional right as part of a
settlement or other contract, it must have a
legitimate reason for including the waiver in the
particular agreement. A legitimate reason will
almost always include a close nexus—a tight fit—
between the specific interest the government seeks
to advance in the dispute underlying the litigation
involved and the specific right waived.125
In Rumery, there was a “tight fit” between the interests
advanced in the underlying litigation and interest waived.126 The
criminal charges against the defendant in Rumery and the civil
suit filed by the defendant arose from the same incident.127 In
resolving the dispute between the defendant and the prosecutor,
both matters needed to be resolved.128 In contrast, “the nexus
between the individual right waived and the dispute that was
resolved by the settlement agreement is not a close one” for Dr.
Davies and the school district.129 The underlying dispute between
Dr. Davies and the school district had “little connection” with
the potential of Dr. Davies running for election.130 The Ninth

124

Id. at 1399.
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
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Circuit concluded that “[t]he absence of a close nexus will
ordinarily show that the government is seeking the waiver of
important rights without a legitimate governmental interest that
justifies doing so.”131 The Ninth Circuit did not go so far as to
say the absence of a “close nexus” was enough to make a
contract provision unenforceable.132 But without a strong public
policy in favor of enforcement, a contract provision will be
unenforceable.133 The Ninth Circuit found the provision
unenforceable because in their view there was no strong public
policy in favor of enforcement on the facts.134
Relying solely on Grossmont, the provision in the
settlement between MSU and the survivors of Larry Nassar’s
abuse could be deemed unenforceable, as well as any similar
provisions in future settlements. The Ninth Circuit relied on a
number of distinctions between Rumery and the case at hand, and
similar distinctions exist here. First, the right that was waived
was one of fundamental importance. The survivors of Nassar’s
abuse waived their right to political advocacy regarding specific

131

Id.
See id. (“Although there may be circumstances in which the public
interest that would be served by enforcement of a settlement agreement is so
strong that it outweighs the absence of a close nexus, such cases are the
exception rather than the rule.”).
133
See id.
134
Id.
132
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reform bills.135 This is, at its core, political speech, which has
traditionally been afforded the most protection.136 Like the right
to vote and run for office at issue in Grossmont,137 the right to
political speech can only be restricted as necessary to achieve a
compelling government interest.138
Second, like the right at issue in Grossmont, the right to
political speech here affects the public at large. Whether the two
reform bills mentioned in the settlement became law directly
impacts the citizens of Michigan. The bills had the potential to
open other government actors up to liability and affect the rights
of any Michigander to sue.139 Furthermore, it had a direct effect
on the plaintiffs in pending litigation against MSU.140 The reform
bills had the potential to open up MSU to liability in future
cases.141 The Grossmont court stressed that the voters should have
the right to choose their elected officials.142 Just as the citizens of
Michigan have the right to choose through their representatives
what bills are enacted. As in Grossmont,143 there are fundamental

135

See Meyers, supra note 10.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339-40
(2010).
137
Grossmont, 930 F.2d at 1397.
138
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
139
See Leblanc & Oosting, supra note 18.
140
See supra note 24.
141
See supra note 24.
142
Grossmont, 930 F.2d at 1398.
143
Id. (“[D]emocratic government is premised on the proposition that the
people are the best judges of their own interests, and that in the long run it is
136
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constitutional rights at issue that affect the public at large, and
thus there is a public interest in favor of nonenforcement.
A sticking point for the Ninth Circuit was that the school
board was using the settlement to silence a political rival outside
the democratic process.144 MSU is not a political rival of the
survivors of the abuse; however, MSU has directly opposed the
reform bills advocated by the survivors and has benefitted
politically from the survivors’ silence.145 In some ways, this does
make them political rivals.
In Grossmont, the Ninth Circuit balanced the public
interest in non-enforcement with the interests in enforcement.146
Similarly, there is a public interest here in encouraging settling
and favoring enforcement of private agreements. But the Ninth
Circuit concluded that when there is a strong interest in favor of
nonenforcement, the interest in settling is not enough. MSU’s
interest in supporting policies limiting their liability is also likely

better to permit them to make their own mistakes than to permit their
“rulers” to make all their decisions for them.”)
144
Id. (“As harmful as such agreements are in general, they are particularly
offensive where, as here, the parties authorizing the payment are elected
officials and the recipient is a potential political opponent.”).
145
See Jonathan Oosting & Kim Kozlowski, Engler: Lawmakers ‘Interfered’ in
Settlement Talks, THE DETROIT NEWS (March 15, 2018),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2018/03/15/msunassar-lawsuit-talks-divisions/32961185/ (“Lawmakers scaled back broader
retroactive and immunity elimination provisions this week amid intense
lobbying from [MSU]…”).
146
Id.
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an insufficient additional interest. The issue of whether or not
certain reform bills are good policy is a matter for the legislators
and their constituents to decide, rather than MSU.
MSU has an additional interest in enforcing the provision
as it shields MSU from liability. In Rumery, the plurality gave
weight to the government wanting to shield itself from frivolous
§ 1983 claims.147 In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor agreed,
saying “[s]paring the local community the expense of litigation
associated with some minor crimes for which there is little or no
public interest in prosecution may be a legitimate objective of a
release-dismissal agreement.”148
However, the MSU settlement is distinct from the releasedismissal agreement at issue in Rumery. First, the link between
MSU shielding itself from frivolous claims and the settlement is
more attenuated. The settlement deals with advocacy for specific
reform bills, not specifically with any particular claims or
settlement.149 And second, MSU is not merely shielding itself
from “minor crimes for which there is little or no public interest.”
MSU is working to shield itself from liability from one of the
largest sports and sex abuse scandals in history. Given these

147

Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987).
Id. at 399-400 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
149
Theisen, supra note 24.
148
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distinctions, it is unlikely that MSU’s interest in shielding itself
from liability would be given the same weight as in Rumery.
Balancing the public policy interests in enforcement and
nonenforcement according to Grossmont, it is likely that the
provision in the MSU settlement would be unenforceable. Given
the respect afforded to political speech, it also seems likely that
similar provisions relating to political advocacy in settlement
agreements would be unenforceable when applying the
Grossmont standard.
The Ninth Circuit also invalidated the provision of the
settlement in Grossmont on constitutional grounds.150 The MSU
settlement also involves a state actor151, MSU, so it was worth
analyzing this as well. Following the Ninth Circuit’s rationale in
Grossmont, the MSU settlement provision would likely fail
because there is no “close nexus” between the government
interest in the dispute underlying the litigation and the specific
right waived. Here, the underlying dispute is over MSU’s
involvement in Nassar’s sexual abuse. The right waived is the
survivor’s political speech related to the reform bills. The
survivor’s advocacy for reform has little to do with the dispute

150
151

Grossmont, 930 F.2d at 1399.
See supra Section I.
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over MSU’s liability for the abuse. According to Grossmont,152 this
gives rise to the presumption that there is no legitimate
government interest. Without a well-articulated and legitimate
government interest, MSU would likely fail at enforcing the
provision under this analysis as well.
The petition for writ of certiorari for Grossmont was
denied,153 and as it stands Grossmont is still good law in the Ninth
Circuit. Although no other circuits have taken up the analysis in
Grossmont, it has been distinguished on a few occasions.154 But
those cases have been distinguished only on the grounds that
there was no state actor155 or that there was no public interest at
issue.156
What would the Supreme Court do with a case like
Grossmont or a challenge to the MSU settlement? Did the Ninth
Circuit in Grossmont go beyond where the Supreme Court would

152

930 F.2d at 1399 (“The absence of a close nexus will ordinarily show that
the government is seeking the waiver of important rights without a
legitimate governmental interest that justifies doing so.”).
153
Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.
1991), cert denied, 501 U.S. 1252 (June 28, 1991).
154
See Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof’l Publ’ns v. Multistate Legal
Studies, Inc., 26 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1994); Wilkicki v. Brady, 882 F. Supp.
1227 (D.R.I. 1995); State v. Noah, 9 P.3d 858 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
155
Noah, 9 P.3d at 871 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (“[Grossmont] is not applicable
here because it was a case of state action where the school district was a
party.”).
156
See Wilkicki v. Brady, 882 F.Supp 1227 (D.R.I. 1995)
(“In [Grossmont], the enforcement of plaintiff's waiver compromises a
fundamental right of the public; in this case, the enforcement of the waiver
does not.”).
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go? The Supreme Court in recent years has placed significant
weight on the value of political speech.157 The Court has also
given strong protection to speech on matters of public concern.158
Furthermore, the MSU case involves not only political speech
but also state action to silence political advocacy. It is therefore
possible that the Supreme Court would move to protect political
speech. Looking at traditional constitutional doctrines and
recent case law, the survivors of Nassar’s abuse could likely
succeed in challenging the settlement provision silencing their
political advocacy. The survivors also likely have a successful
challenge under traditional contract theory.

II. TRADITIONAL CONTRACT THEORY
The settlement agreement between MSU and the
survivors of Nassar’s abuse is a contract between the two parties
and is thus subject to the traditional rules of contracting.159 As
such, it is important to analyze whether the settlement can be
challenged under traditional contract principles. The settlement
agreement is unique in that, in part, it is a contract to buy the

157

See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339-40
(2010).
158
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 552 (2011).
159
See Knudsen v. C.I.R., 793 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015)
(“A settlement is a contract,
and its enforceability is governed by familiar principles of contract law.”).

2019]

IS SILENCE FOR SALE?

173

survivors’ silence related to their political advocacy. Given that
the settlement is a unique form of contract, it can be challenged
under public policy doctrine.
Generally, great weight and recognition is given to the
“freedom of contract.”160 However, there is significant debate
about “contracts of silence”161 and whether they should be
treated differently because they suppress speech.162 Contracts of
silence are exactly what they sound like; contracts where one or
both parties agree to remain silent about a subject. Contracts of
silence have exploded in the last forty years with the rise of the
non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”), one form of the contract of
silence.163 Contracts of silence are used to conceal a range of
information,

including

trade

secrets,

sexual

harassment

allegations, and environmental hazards.164 The freedom of
speech is critical, yet not all contracts of silence are harmful.165
Companies are and should be allowed to protect their trade
secrets from contractors and former employees166 and celebrities
can and should be able to keep their address and location

160

Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 264 (1998).
161
See id. at 268.
162
Id. at 266.
163
Michelle Dean, Contracts of Silence, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Winter
2018), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/nda-agreement.php/.
164
Id.
165
See Garfield, supra note 166, at 275.
166
Id. at 269.
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private.167 Contracts of silence can still be used in dangerous
ways.168 For example, non-disclosure agreements are frequently
cited as an explanation for why sexual predators can continue to
harm new victims.169 In essence, not all contracts of silence are
created equal. The legal system should be equipped to handle
these differences.170
Though the law places great weight on the freedom to
contract, it is not an absolute right. 171 Under traditional contract
theory, the courts have a variety of tools for dealing with the
disparities in value among contracts of silence.172

Courts

regularly refuse to enforce contracts for a wide variety of
reasons.173 Some contracts of silence can be found unenforceable
under traditional contract principals such as unconscionability174
or duress.175 In determining the enforceability of contracts of
silence, the most relevant contract doctrine is public policy.176
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Id. at 331-32. See Dean, supra note 169.
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See Dean, supra note 169.
170
See Garfield, supra note 166, at 269.
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See id. at 294.
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See id. at 276.
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See id. at 276-92.
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See, e.g., Disher v. Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d 639, 644 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984) (invalidating overbroad employee confidentiality agreement on public
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agreement); see also id. at 285.
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Id. at 286.
176
See id.
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“Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, a
contract or term will be unenforceable when public policy
considerations against enforcement clearly outweigh the
interests in favor of enforcement.”177 Courts are given wide
discretion to consider both laws and their own sense of what
should be enforceable in deciding what violates public policy.178
Under Section 178 of the Restatement, a contract
provision is unenforceable under public policy “if legislation
provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement
is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
against the enforcement of such terms.”179 This means that courts
may find a contract provision unenforceable when (1) there is
legislation specifically stating such or (2) when the “public policy
against enforcement clearly outweighs the interests in favor of
enforcing the term.”180 Generally courts consider legislation, case
law, and their own judgment to decide what is good for public

177

Id. at 294-95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM.
see, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 403
(1987).
178
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 1981); see also Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S.
353, 356 (1931) (“The meaning of the phrase ‘public policy’ is vague and
variable; courts have not defined it, and there is no fixed rule by which to
determine what contracts are repugnant to it.”).
179
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
180
Garfield, supra note 166, at 296-97.
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welfare in determining what violates public policy.181 Given the
weight and importance of the private right to contract, courts
have historically limited their use of the public policy
exception.182 While courts should remain restrained in their use
of the public policy exception, there are times when society
would benefit more from not enforcing a contract or a contract
provision.183
No bright line rule exists for determining whether
contracts of silence are unenforceable on public policy
grounds.184 Courts will almost always enforce contracts requiring
silence related to trade secrets;185 however, courts will almost
always refuse to enforce a contract on public policy grounds that
requires a party to remain silent about the commission of a
crime.186 Most contracts of silence exist somewhere in in between

181

Id. at 297; see also Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 115 N.E.
505, 507 (Ohio 1916) (“Sometimes such public policy is declared by
Constitution; sometimes by statute; sometimes by judicial decision. More
often, however, it abides only in the customs and conventions of the people .
. .”).
182
Garfield, supra note 166, at 298-99; see also Twin City Pipe Line Co. v.
Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356 (1931) (“The principle
that contracts in contravention of public policy are not enforceable should be
applied with caution and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which
that doctrine rests.”).
183
Garfield, supra note 166, at 299.
184
Id.
185
See id. at 300-306; see, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470 (1974) (discussing the role and importance of trade secret law).
186
Garfield, supra note 166, at 302-03; see, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 696 (1972) (“. . . it is obvious that agreements to conceal information
relevant to commission of crime have very little to recommend them from
the standpoint of public policy.”).
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these two examples.187 How should courts deal with these
contracts? How should courts determine public policy when
there are no relevant laws on point? The broad text of the
Restatement188 has given courts little guidance in formulating a
test for determining public policy.189
Comparing the two extremes of contracts of silence, Alan
Garfield proposes that “[a] court must compare the strength of
the public and private interests in enforcing a contract that
suppresses speech”190 (the “confidentiality interest”) “with the
competing public interest in not having the threat of contractual
liability inhibit speech”191 (the “disclosure interest”). When the
disclosure interest clearly outweighs the confidentiality interest,
the contract is not enforceable.192 In determining whether the
public interest in speech overrides the interest in contract
enforcement, Garfield suggests looking at other areas of the
law.193 For example, trade secret law suggests, “that a person's
interest in protecting trade secrets is sufficient to override the

187

Garfield, supra note 166, at 312.
“A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in
its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
against the enforcement of such terms.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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See Garfield, supra note 166, at 314.
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Id. at 315.
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public interest in access to such information.”194 Garfield argues
that determining the balance of interests in any given case
depends greatly on the facts.195
Under traditional contract theory, the settlement
agreement provision at issue in the MSU case is likely
unenforceable on public policy grounds. There are quite a few
interests in favor of “confidentiality.” First, the settlement was
freely entered into by the plaintiffs. Second, the historic
settlement amount was likely due in part to the survivors being
compensated for their silence. MSU agreed to settle at such a
great expense, in part, because the university wanted to buy their
silence. In MSU’s view, the survivors were justly compensated
for their rights. Third, the parties entered into the agreement with
the expectation that the settlement would be enforced. Contracts
function because both parties operate under the assumption the
contract will be enforced.196 If parties have reason to doubt the
enforceability of their contract, they have less reason to abide by
it.
In terms of “disclosure interests,” the citizens of
Michigan had an interest in hearing from those directly affected

194

Id.
Id. at 318.
196
See Chunlin Leonhard, Illegal Agreements and the Lesser Evil Principle, 64
CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 833, 846-47 (2015).
195
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by Nassar’s abuse in forming their opinions about reform
measures. The reform measures were designed to protect past
and future victims of abuse, and the voices of survivors could
help the general public better understand the strengths and
weaknesses of these provisions as well as the differences that
reform could make. There is also a strong interest in not allowing
government actors to circumvent the political process in their
favor. It is possible that the reform bills would have failed on
their own, but that is for the legislators and their constituents to
decide. Michigan State University should not be able to decide
its own future liability. The sheer importance of the political
process and allowing political actors full knowledge in making
decisions outweighs any confidentiality interest.
State laws can give an indication of a state’s public policy
interest in determining whether a contract should be
enforceable.197 For example, if a state has a statute protecting
trade secrets, this suggests that public policy in that state supports
enforcing a contract over a trade secret. Michigan does not have
any relevant laws here, and this does not affect the above balance
between disclosure and confidentiality interests; however the

197

Garfield, supra note 166, at 297.
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area of law surrounding contracts of silence is evolving.198
Several states have debated passing laws forbidding nondisclosure agreements (one form of contracts of silence) in cases
of sexual harassment.199 If settlements like the one in the MSU
case become more common, it would be important to monitor
how states are regulating non-disclosure agreements in sexual
harassment cases. It is possible that states will change their laws
in the wake of the #MeToo200 movement.201 If a state were to
pass a law forbidding non-disclosure agreements in sexual
harassment cases, a settlement like the one between MSU and
the survivors of Nassar’s abuse would likely be outright
unenforceable under that law, or at least unenforceable under the
public policy doctrine.

198

See Stephanie Russell-Kraft, How to End the Silence Around SexualHarassment Settlements, THE NATION (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/how-to-end-the-silence-around-sexualharassment-settlements/.
199
Id.
200
The #MeToo movement refers generally to the anti-sexual harassment
movement. The movement has grown tremendously over the last few years
and has been a public reckoning for powerful men in the entertainment
business and politics. See Christen A. Johnson & KT Hawbaker, #MeToo: A
Timeline of Events, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (July 17, 2019, 7:12 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208htmlstory.html.
201
See Russell-Kraft, supra note 203, at 3 (“To address the harms that
confidentiality requirements impose, lawmakers in a handful of states,
including New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, have floated bills to
bar nondisclosure provisions in . . . settlements relating to claims of
discrimination, retaliation, and harassment.”).
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Non-disclosure agreements are slightly different from
what is at stake in the MSU settlement, but they are similar
enough to suggest a state’s public policy would not allow a
similar settlement to be enforced. Under a non-disclosure
agreement, a party would still be allowed to engage in political
advocacy; however, they would not be able to discuss the
specifics of their case. Sexual harassment can, in many cases, be
a matter of public concern.202 Political speech of the kind at issue
in the MSU settlement is a significant matter of public concern
because the reform bills would have affected the rights and
responsibilities of all Michigan citizens. There is even greater
public interest and effect in a similar settlement than a nondisclosure agreement, which suggests they would be given
equal–or even greater–protection.
III. CONCLUSION
So far, Nassar’s victims have not challenged the terms of
their settlement agreement with MSU. The day the settlement
was certified, the Michigan state legislature dropped the two
reform bills at issue.203 The Michigan legislature is free to
continue to work on and pass reform bills in the future and could
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even go so far as to introduce identical bill text under a new
name. So why does it matter that the settlement provision was
likely unconstitutional and unenforceable on public policy
grounds? And as a society, are we comfortable with the way the
scenario played out?
The survivors got what they wanted out of the settlement.
That matters. On some level, they were given power over their
story and their narrative. Many survivors of sexual abuse prefer
to stay quiet about what happened and move on with their
lives.204 Arguably, the survivors of Nassar’s abuse were
appropriately compensated for the rights that they gave up. The
average payout survivors received for the settlement is $1.2
million.205 That is ten to fourteen times more than what survivors
of sexual abuse typically receive in settlements in Michigan.206
Furthermore, the settlement did not foreclose any future
opportunities to become advocates for social or political change
or for survivors to speak about their experience.
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Still, there is something inherently disturbing about MSU
essentially buying survivors’ silence. While the survivors were
compensated, there is no way to calculate the benefit that their
advocacy could have given the public at large. The idea that
political speech has a value and can essentially be sold to the
government is a difficult pill to swallow. Moreover, the Michigan
legislators and their constituents should have the power to decide
how to address the problem of child sexual abuse and whether
government entities could be liable in those situations. This
settlement took that power away from the legislature and their
constituents.
Because the settlement involved over three hundred
plaintiffs, it is possible that not every plaintiff got a fair deal.207
The reform bills were introduced with the help of a few of
Nassar’s victims.208 With such a large group of plaintiffs engaged
in the settlement negotiations, it is easy to imagine that some
parties had to make concessions for the benefit of the group that
they might not have made if negotiating alone.209 For some, the
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rights they gave up may have meant little, and for others they
may have meant much more. The few survivors that helped
introduce the bill may not have wanted to impede the settlement
for the rest of the group. And while the settlement may have only
effectively silenced a few voices, but even one political voice
silenced, in this case, is too many.
Unfortunately, what happened with Larry Nassar is likely
not the last of these kinds of scandals. Currently, over one
hundred students at Ohio State University have spoken up about
misconduct by a team doctor and a professor at the school.210
Additionally, more than fifty women at the University of
Southern California have come forward with allegations against
a campus gynecologist.211 As states and universities grapple with
what to do in the wake of #MeToo, settlements with similar
provisions are not out of the question. In making legislative
decisions, states and their citizens should be able to hear from all
interested and affected parties.
Finally, the use of this strategy has implications beyond
sexual violence and into different areas of the law. What if a local
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government settles over an environmental disaster but requires
the plaintiffs to end their advocacy efforts? Or a police
department settles a claim related to misconduct that requires the
victim to stop pursuing criminal justice reform? Silence on these
issues technically has a price—$1.2 million, but can we live with
that?

